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ABSTRACT
With the popularity of Android apps, different techniques have
been proposed to enhance app protection. As an effective approach
to prevent reverse engineering, obfuscation can be used to serve
both benign andmalicious purposes. In recent years, more andmore
sensitive logic or data have been implemented as obfuscated native
code because of the limitations of Java bytecode. As a result, native
code obfuscation becomes a great obstacle for security analysis to
understand the complicated logic. In this paper, we propose DiANa,
an automated system to facilitate the deobfuscation of native bi-
nary code in Android apps. Specifically, given a binary obfuscated
by Obfuscator-LLVM (the most popular native code obfuscator),
DiANa is capable of recovering the original Control Flow Graph.
To the best of our knowledge, DiANa is the first system that aims
to tackle the problem of Android native binary deobfuscation. We
have applied DiANa in different scenarios, and the experimental
results demonstrate the effectiveness of DiANa based on generic
similarity comparison metrics.
1 INTRODUCTION
Android apps have received widespread adoption recently [24].
Besides the standard Android programming model in Java, Android
NDK [9] was introduced to allow developers to include native code
binaries (write in C/C++) in their apps.
Recent work suggested that native code had beenwidely used [21,
22, 47] in Android apps, which severely complicates the process of
static analysis. As Java bytecode can be easily decompiled, malware
developers usually hide the malicious payload and core functionali-
ties in the native code to evade detection [6, 7, 18, 21]. Even worse,
native code can also be obfuscated, which further increases the
difficulty of security analysis. For example, the towelroot exploit
(CVE-2014-3153) [1, 4], one of the biggest Root Exploits family in
Android, was found obfuscated at the native code level by O-LLVM.
It took a lot of efforts for security researchers to dive into the tech-
nical details of the code due to obfuscation. Figure 1 shows the
control flow graph of an obfuscated function “search_goodnum”,
which is one of the key components of a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) im-
plementation of the towelroot exploit. Apparently, the obfuscated
control flow becomes too complex to understand the real logic.
Although several attempts [26, 27] have discussed the deobfus-
cation of Android apps, all of them have been focused on Java-level
deobfuscation. For example, DeGuard [27] was proposed to reverse
layout obfuscation (naming obfuscation) generated by ProGuard.
Their key idea is to learn a probabilistic model over a large number
of non-obfuscated apps and to use this model to deobfuscate new
APKs. Layout obfuscation is the easiest one in Android app obfus-
cation, which does not alter the program logic (e.g., control flow)
Figure 1: The CFG of an obfuscation function in POC of the
TowelRoot exploit.
of the apps. To the best of our knowledge, no previous studies have
attempted to tackle native code deobfuscation for Android yet.
Motivation. The focus of this paper is deobfuscating the native
code in Android apps. To be specific, we focus on the deobfuscation
of native code that was protected by Obfuscator-LLVM (O-LLVM),
which is the most popular native code obfuscator. O-LLVM is a set
of obfuscating code transformations suite, which is implemented as
middle-end passes in the LLVM compilation flow. O-LLVM offers
three obfuscating methods: Instruction Substitution (InsSub), Bo-
gus Control Flow (BCF) and Control Flow Flattening (CFF). Many
popular packing tools, e.g., Baidu Jiagu [11] and Bancle [12], are
implemented based on O-LLVM.
Challenges. Binary code deobfuscation is not a new task intro-
duced in Android, as many studies have already been proposed for
PC platforms (e.g., x86). Udupa et al. [49] use static techniques to
remove the dead edges added by the obfuscator. Yadegari et al. [57]
proposed a deobfuscating approach based on the execution trace
of the executable code. However, it is non-trivial to deobfuscate
Android native binary code because there are no existing deobfusca-
tion tools that can deal with full O-LLVM obfuscation, especially in
the scenario of Android apps and for the ARM platform. Specifically,
we face the following main challenges in this work:
• Complexity due to instruction optimization on ARM.
Due to the specific optimizations on the ARM platform, some
obfuscated operations may not be independent. It may be
interleaved with normal instructions and operations. Thus
it becomes a challenge to comprehensively and accurately
pinpoint the obfuscated instructions.
• Difficulty in control flow recovery due to basic block
splitting. Control Flow Flattening in O-LLVM obfuscation
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can completely destroy the original control flow. At the
same time, original basic blocks can also be split or partially
merged, whichmay cause the separation of original semantic
information. It becomes difficult to properly recover control
flow in this kind of situations.
• Challenges in symbolic execution due to unknownpath
constrains. We will apply symbolic execution as one of the
key steps in deobfuscation for the purpose of systematically
exploring multiple program paths, similar as in previous
work [35, 36, 55]. However, since the recovering process
of O-LLVM obfuscated binary is flow-sensitive, incomplete
context information may lead to incomplete or wrong path
exploration, while performing symbolic execution directly
will cause the path explosion problem. Thus we need to find
a way to retain the context information as much as possible,
while avoiding path explosion during symbolic execution.
Approach In this paper, we propose DiANa (Deobfusca-tion
of Android Native Binary Code), a new approach for automated
deobfuscation of Android native binary code. Technically, DiANa
works by combining static taint analysis and symbolic execution to
remove the obfuscation introduced by different obfuscating tech-
niques in O-LLVM. One key feature of DiANa is that we introduce
taint analysis to perform semantic level deobfuscation, while con-
sidering both general and compiler optimization situation. We also
exploit flow-sensitive symbolic execution to rebuild the seriously
obfuscated control flow. To overcome the challenge of basic block
splitting, we chop the original control flow, select analysis targets
through static features, and dynamically adjust the analysis target
sequence to maximize context inheritance.
Experiments on multiple benchmarks and real-world cases sug-
gest that our approach can accurately deobfuscate native code
obfuscated by O-LLVM. We believe DiANa can be used by security
analysts to make it easier to inspect native code, even if it was heav-
ily obfuscated. This paper makes the following major contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to tackle
native code deobfuscation in Android apps. Our approach is
able to handle different obfuscations provided by O-LLVM,
the most popular obfuscator for Android.
• We design and implement DiANa, a system that can suc-
cessfully deobfuscate native code in Android apps. DiANa
leverages taint analysis to overcome the complication due to
ARM-specific optimizations. It also deploys flow-sensitive
symbolic execution to tackle Control Flow Flattening obfus-
cation in O-LLVM.
• Our evaluation on a set of Android apps demonstrates that
DiANa is effective in native code deobfuscation and could
become a valuable tool for tasks including program analysis
and malware detection. We will release our system and the
benchmarks to the research community at:
[Link removed due to double-blind requirement.]
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that tackles An-
droid native code deobfuscation in our community. Nevertheless,
there are already many studies on code obfuscation and deobfusca-
tion for applications on both mobile and PC platforms.
2.1 Android App Obfuscation
To increase the bar for reverse engineering and hinder cracking, and
prevent theft of intellectual property, code obfuscation techniques
have been widely used in Android apps [32], for both legitimate
apps and malware. Many tools allow developers to obfuscate their
apps [8, 10, 14, 19, 20, 38]. For example, ProGuard is a popular
obfuscation tool integrated in the Android build system. These tools
may operate at different levels, e.g., Java code level, Dex bytecode
level and native code level.
Native code level protection is much stronger than Java-level
protection, thus state-of-the-art commercial packers utilize native
code obfuscation to increase the complexity of reverse engineer-
ing [33]. As a side effect, Android malware also take advantage of
native code obfuscation to evade detection.
Obfuscator-LLVM (O-LLVM) is one of the most widely used
code obfuscator for both x86 and ARM platforms [38]. It is imple-
mented as middle-end passes in the LLVM compilation process,
which offers guaranteed compatibility with LLVM. It offers the
following three obfuscation techniques:
(1) Instruction Substitution (InsSub). InsSub is the simplest
obfuscation technique in O-LLVM. It replaces the standard binary
operations, e.g., arithmetic (ADD, SUB) or boolean ones (AND,
OR and XOR), by functionally equivalent but more complicated
sequences of instructions. For each kind of operations, there are
multiple ways to perform obfuscation. InsSub chooses one at ran-
dom to increase code diversification in the resulting obfuscated
code.
(2) Bogus Control Flow (BCF). BCFmodifies the CFG by adding
a conditional jump to randomly selected basic blocks, which either
points to the original basic block or to a fake basic block looping
back to the conditional jump block[38]. In order to evade detection
and optimization by the optimizers, an opaque predicate [50] (i.e.,
a mathematical expression which always evaluating to the same
value) is used to ensure that only the original basic block is executed
during run-time.
(3) Control Flow Flattening (CFF). This is the most effective,
and the most difficult to deobfuscate, pass in O-LLVM. The basic
idea is to remove all easily identifiable conditional jumps (e.g.,
IF-ELSE) and looping structures (e.g., WHILE,FOR), and use a big
switch construct to route the code control flow through the proper
basic blocks. The flow dispatcher chooses the next block using a
routing variable, which resets in each basic block and leads the
flow to the next correct basic block. Besides, there is a compilation
flag that enables further breaking the code structure by artificially
increasing the number of basic blocks in a function.
In general, InsSub and BCF are both semantic obfuscations that
work at the instruction level, while CFF is an overall remodeling of
the control flow in a function.
2.2 Mobile App Deobfuscation
Although several attempts have been focused on the deobfuscation
of Android apps, all of them deal with Java-level deobfuscation.
DeGuard [27] was proposed to deal with layout obfuscation intro-
duced by ProGuard [20]. The key idea is to summarize a probabilistic
model by learning unobfuscated apps on a large scale and then use
the model to recover the obfuscated code. Also, Baumann et al. [26]
use a similar approach to perform ProGuard deobfuscation by code
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matching. However, layout obfuscation is the easiest, as it does not
alter the program logic.
2.3 General Code Deobfuscation
Binary code deobfuscation has been widely studied for the PC plat-
forms (x86) [15, 31, 35, 36, 39, 41, 42, 49, 56, 57]. The closest work
related to ours might be the one proposed by Gabriel [35], which
attempted to recover O-LLVM obfuscated code on the x86 platform.
The work is based on the Miasm [17] framework to reverse the
obfuscated function to a control flow graph. Similarly, El-Faramaw
et al. [15] used a similar approach based on the Binary Ninja frame-
work [13]. However, they did not tackle the challenges introduced
by basic block splitting and instruction optimization, which pose
a great challenge for both x86 and ARM platforms. Besides, they
did not provide an effective method to identify the obfuscation
techniques used in a binary. Finally, context inheritance and sub-
function calls are not considered in their work, which is more likely
to fail when analyzing large programs. Yadegari et al. [57] pro-
posed a generic approach to automatically deobfuscate binary code
on x86. They use the execution trace extracted from a specific dy-
namic analysis environment as the input of their system. As a result,
their work is not suitable on analyzing shared libraries in Android
projects because most shared libraries lack of main functions or
entry points [53].
3 APPROACH OVERVIEW
Goal. We use the term deobfuscation to refer to the process of
removing the effects of obfuscation from the native binary, and
ideally recover the original code and control flow before obfuscation.
For a given APK input, DiANa first extracts the native binary and
determines whether it is obfuscated, then analyzes and transforms
the code to obtain a functionally equivalent form that is simpler
and easier to understand. For non-trivial code, the deobfuscation
results is rarely the same as the original code, however, it is close
to the original and much easier to understand compared to the
obfuscated version.
Key Techniques. To address the aforementioned challenges, we
rely on taint analysis and enhanced symbolic execution to recover
O-LLVM obfuscated code. Taint analysis is used to address the
challenge introduced by instruction optimization, which performs
global feature matching to comprehensively detect all obfusca-
tions introduced by O-LLVM and identify instructions needed to be
rewritten by tracking tainted registers. Symbolic execution is used
to reconstruct the control flow ruined by CFF. We first identify basic
blocks that maintain original operations based on an ARM-specific
basic block classification approach. Then we perform chopped sym-
bolic execution [48] to address the path explosion challenge. To
perform flow-sensitive symbolic execution, we use dynamic queue
scheduling to maximize the context inheritance and rebuild the
original control flow.
Overall Architecture. Fig. 2 illustrates the system architecture
of DiANa that is mainly composed of four parts. During the pre-
processing stage, DiANa first determines what kinds of obfuscation
techniques are used in the input binary. Then it performs semantic
level deobfuscation for InsSub and BCF based on mainly taint analy-
sis. For the binaries protected by CFF, DiANa will perform chopped
Figure 2: Overall architecture of DiANa.
flow-sensitive symbolic execution to rebuild the control flow. Then
the recovered control flow will be optimized in consideration of
basic block splitting. All the deobfuscation results will be integrated
and rewritten to the binary(or control flow graph) in the end.
Next, we will elaborate on the details of DiANa and how it works
on each obfuscation technique in O-LLVM.
4 INSTRUCTION SUBSTITUTION
DEOBFUSCATION
The basic idea of InsSub is to replace standard binary operations
by functionally equivalent but more complicated sequences of in-
structions. Note that in order to avoid the interference of constant
folding [51], we set all variable as unknown numbers in our analy-
sis, e.g. a variable waiting for user’s input, in order to keep InsSub
activated. Table 1 summarizes 13 kinds of instruction substitution
in 5 different categories, which are all the transformations we can
find in O-LLVM. Among these transformations, three cases (which
are highlighted in the table) are new and not specified in previous
work [38].
Challenges. For each kind of operation, there are multiple ways
to replace it with functionality equivalent instructions. To achieve
code diversification in the final results, the InsSub obfuscator ran-
domly chooses one way to do the obfuscation. Besides, the obfus-
cated instructions are often interleaved with normal instructions
(unobfuscated ones) at the assembly level, which is hard to separate.
As a result, it is not enough by simply searching for specific opcode
combinations during InsSub deobfuscation. Instead, we introduce
static taint analysis to address this challenge.
Method.We apply taint analysis to determine the combination
of obfuscating instructions and locate instructions needed to be
rewritten. We use the following example to illustrate how to use
taint analysis to deobfuscate InsSub.
As shown in Fig. 3(a), assuming line 4 does not exist, the opera-
tions from line 3 to line 6 will lead to R7 = R7+R5+1−R5 = R7+1.
After matching the opcode sequence ADD,ADD, SUB and identify-
ing the relationship between these operands, DiANa will directly
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Table 1: Semantic features used in InsSub.
Obfuscated Expression Origin Expression
a = b - (-c)
a = -(-b + (-c))
a = b + r; a += c; a -= r
a = b - r; a += c; a += r
a = b + c
a = b + (-c)
a = -((-b) + c)
a = b + r; a -= c; a -= r
a = b - r; a -= c; a += r
a = b - c
a = (b ⊕ ! c) & b
a = !(!b | !c) & (r | !r) a = b & c
a = (b & c) | (b ⊕ c) a = b | c
a = (!b & c) | (b & !c)
a = (b ⊕ r) ⊕ (c ⊕ r) a = b ⊕ c
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
1 MOV R0 , R4
2 BL p r i n t f
3 ADD R0 , R7 , R5
4 SUB R6 , R0 , #1
5 ADD R0 , R0 , #1
6 SUB R7 , R0 , R5
7 B loc_8A0
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
( a ) Ob fu s ca t ed
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
MOV R0 , R4
BL p r i n t f
ADD R0 , R7 , R5
SUB R6 , R0 , #1
ADD R7, R7, #1
NOP
B loc_8A0
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
( b ) Deob fus ca t ed
Figure 3: An example of InsSub deobfuscation.
deobfuscate the assembly instruction sequence to its simplest form,
ADDR7,R7, #1. Finally, line 5 and line 6 will be replaced by NOP.
However, the existence of line 4 indicates that the value of R6
depends on R0. In this case, DiANa will set the modified register
R0 in line 3 as a tainted register. If there is an instruction operating
with the tainted register between or after obfuscated instructions,
the involved obfuscated instruction will be retained. As a result,
instruction in Line 3 will be retained and instruction in Line 5 and
6 will be set as “to be patched”. The tainted register will be freed
after being modified by the follow-up instruction that is not related
to this obfuscating procedure.
The deobfuscation result of InsSub is shown in Fig. 3(b). The
content and address of the instructions that need to be modified
will be saved temporarily and wait until other deobfuscating work
finished, before rewritten to the binary.
5 BOGUS CONTROL FLOW DEOBFUSCATION
BCF obfuscation introduces opaque predicates[50] into the func-
tions. The opaque predicate expression used in O-LLVM is y<10 or
(x*(x-1) mod 2)==0. The second half of the expression is an odd
number multiplying an even number modulo 2, which must equal 0.
Hence, the whole expression will always be true, and the obfuscator
introduces a dead branch to the code. Note that the branch will not
be optimized by compilers due to the uncertainty of x.
Challenges.Although BCF obfuscation hasmodified the control
flow (by introducing dead branches), it is still instruction-level
Block C
Block B
SUB R2, R0, #1
MUL R3, R2, R0
ANDS R2, R3, #1
BNE Block C
Block A
...
CMP R1, #0xA
BLT Block B
Block D
ADD R5, R5, #0x1
CMP R1, #0xA
BLT loc_xxx
Block E
CMP R2, #0
BEQ loc_xxx
Block B
NOP
NOP
NOP
B Block D
Block A
...
CMP R1, #0xA
B Block B
Block D
ADD R5, R5, #0x1
CMP R1, #0xA
B Block E
Block E
NOP
B loc_xxx(1) Obfuscated (2) Deobfuscated
Figure 4: An example of BCF deobfuscation.
obfuscation. As a result, the challenge we encountered is similar to
InsSub. However, BCF is significantly more complicated because the
obfuscated instructions are often across basic blocks. To address this
challenge, we also rely on taint analysis to perform global opaque
predicate matching in order to remove dead branches efficiently.
Method.We rely on assembly features to detect whether a bi-
nary is obfuscated by BCF. For the given opaque predicate, we
have summarized multiple assembly features. Note that InsSub may
change the assembly features of BCF (e.g. sub operation may be
obfuscated), thus we also manually summarized BCF features when
InsSub is involved.
BCF introduces two branches to the original block using ‘CMP
Rx, 0xA’ (y<10). One successor block containing the ‘SUB MUL
AND(S)’ combination (maybe different implementations of the same
expression ‘(x*(x-1) mod 2)’ is used to direct the control flow back to
the origin block. Another branch of this successor is always headed
to a dead branch. All basic blocks that take opaque predicates as
jump conditions are designated as predicate blocks. We use Fig. 4 as
an example to show how DiANa works on this obfuscating pass.
As shown in Fig. 4 (1), the ‘SUB MUL ANDS’ sequence first ap-
pears in Block B. When the opaque predicate operation is detected,
taint analysis first sets Block B as a predicate block and sets R2
as a tainted register. Then it will force the conditional jump in the
parent block reaching the predicate block Block B. After that, be-
cause only one condition jump of the predicate block can actually
be accessed, taint analysis will head to Block D and label jump
instruction at the end of Block B as to be modified.
Due to the optimization on ARM instructions during compilation,
sometimes BCF obfuscation can occur as shown in Block E. If a
conditional jump occurs and the constraint is a tainted register
compared to zero (there are some cases that compare with 1), DiANa
will automatically set it as a predicate block. In this case, because
register R2 is tainted, when system traverses the child blocks of
Block D, the block Block E will be set as the predicate block
too. The tainted register will be freed when modified by normal
instructions.
After taint analysis, all deobfuscated information about instruc-
tions that need to be modified will be passed to the rebuilding
process. When the binary is not obfuscated with CFF at the same
time, the deobfuscated result (as shown in Fig. 4 (2)) will be rewrit-
ten to the binary.
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6 CONTROL FLOW FLATTENING
DEOBFUSCATION
The CFF obfuscation rebuilds the control flow to a SWITCH con-
struct. To deobfuscate the control flow, we need to identify basic
blocks that maintain original operations and rebuild the control
flow. Symbolic execution is a means of using symbolic input to
analyze a program to determine what inputs cause each part of
a program to execute [54]. Since the analysis of CFF obfuscated
code is flow sensitive, and symbolic execution has been proved as
an effective program analysis technique that can systematically
explore multiple program paths [23, 28, 29], we combine automatic
static analysis and symbolic execution to deobfuscate the binary
code. However, we still need to address the following Challenges:
(1) Due to the instruction optimizations introduced by the ARM
compiler and obfuscator, original blocks are often split and
reused. It is a challenge to identify the blocks that contain
original operations from a super complicated control flow.
(2) As the original control flow has been destroyed by CFF,
most basic blocks use direct jumps to reach successors after
obfuscation. Before rebuilding the original control flow, we
need to know what kind of blocks have multiple successors
in the original flow.
(3) The recovery work on CFF-obfuscated code is flow-sensitive
(e.g. the switch structure relies on the routing variable, which
affects the control flow), thus we need to know how to max-
imize context inheritance and avoid path explosion.
DiANa first determines whether the code is obfuscated by CFF
during preprocessing, and then conduct static analysis to identify
basic blocks that contain original operations (OO Blocks for short).
After that, it performs flow-sensitive symbolic execution on these
blocks to reconstruct the original control flow. After optimization,
the final deobfuscation result will be written to the output.
6.1 Feature Extraction
Since the flow between basic blocks is directed by a big switch
construct, which is led by a routing variable, we use this switch
construct and routing variable as two fingerprints to identify CFF-
based obfuscation.
The switch construct is actually a nested set of conditional jumps.
As shown in Fig. 5, each block ending with a conditional jump
mainly consists of three instructions. We call these blocks Dis-
patchers. Also, the second operand of the compare instruction,
which is different from other compare operations, is determined by
both the value of the ARMR15 register (Program Counter Register)
and an immediate number α . DiANa calculates the value of routing
variable as follows:
Vroutinд = α + ins .address + 8 (1)
Here, ins.address is the address of the current instruction,
which will be added by 8 (add 4 in Thumb mode), and becomes the
value of Register R15 in the ARM mode. All values of Vroutinд are
saved into a dispatcher dictionary.
6.2 Identification the OO Blocks
Though CFF ruined the original control flow, original operations
still exist in part of the obfuscated basic blocks. To re-construct the
loc_XXX
LDR R2, =0x2FA68070
CMP R1, R2
BLE loc_XXX
Sub_6C4
...
LDR R0, [SP,#0x50+var_28]
STR R0, [SP,#0x50+var_38]
LDR R0, =(aDataError - 0x758)
LDR R1, =0x7DCD6C5E
B loc_7A8
loc_XXX
LDR R2, =0x6FDC2188
CMP R1, R2
BLE loc_XXX
loc_XXX
LDR R2, =0x6FB227A5
CMP R1, R2
BGT loc_XXX
loc_XXX
LDR R2, =0x8C2CB960
CMP R1, R2
BNE loc_76C
loc_XXX
XXXX
loc_XXX
...
MOVEQ R0, #0
SUBEQ SP, R11, #0x1C
LDMEQFD SP!, {R4-R11,PC}
loc_820
...
LDR R1, [R15, #0x118]
( [R15, #0x118]=0x8C2CB960 )
B loc_XXX
loc_XXX
XXXX
Pre-dispatcher
Return
loc_XXX
CMP R2, R1
MOVGE R0, R1
B loc_XXX
Prologue
Relevant
Dispatcher
Figure 5: An example of a CFF obfuscated function.
control flow, we first need to identify the OO Blocks, i.e., the blocks
containing theOriginal Operations. In reference to previous work
on the x86 platform [35], and combined with the characteristics of
CFF on ARM, we divided the obfuscated control flow structure into
five categories, as shown in Fig. 5.
Prologue is the entrance block that contains information about
almost all the constants in the original function.
Dispatcher is a conditional-jumping block whose constraint is
determined by R15 and an immediate number.
Pre-dispatcher is theDispatcher blockwhose in-degree is larger
than two. Note that an obfuscated function may have more than
one Pre-dispatchers.
Return is the basic block whose out-degree is 0. Note that an
obfuscated function may have more than one Return blocks.
Relevant is the basic block that maintains operations of the
original function. DiANa does a reverse traversal from the Pre-
dispatcher until it encounters a Dispatcher block. All basic blocks
in this path between the Pre-dispatcher and Dispatcher are Rele-
vant blocks because these blocks are all dispatched by the switch
structure.
The original operations exist in Prologue, Return and Relevant
Blocks, which forms the OO Blocks. Due to the introduced opti-
mizations, Relevant blocks may be partly merged, as the bottom
gray block shown in Fig. 5. In this case, the block will be duplicated
and added to its two parent nodes.
Determine the number of original successors. Before the
recovering process, we need to determine whether an OO Block
has multiple successors when it was in the original control flow.
The goal of this step is to prepare for subsequent analysis. Symbol
execution will be performed twice to explore each possible path if
a basic block has two successors.
Different from previous work on the x86 platform [35], which
just used the opcode ‘CMOV’ as the feature to detect the existence
of multiple branches, and due to the simplicity of the ARM instruc-
tion set, we use elements in the previously mentioned dispatcher
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dictionary as the main indicator. If the second operand of an as-
signment operation exists in the dispatcher dictionary, the assigned
register will be set as “tainted register”. If there is a tainted-register-
involved conditional move instruction on the path of this block
back to Pre-dispatcher, we consider that this block has multiple
successors in the original control flow. As previously mentioned,
the tainted register will be freed when modified by a normal instruc-
tion. As shown in Fig. 5, the yellow block (loc_820) is an example
that has two branches in the original function.
6.3 Flow-sensitive Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution can be used to systematically explore multiple
program paths[48]. However, due to unknown path constraints
of the obfuscated program, directly applying symbol execution to
explore all possible branches will cause path explosion.
6.3.1 Chopped Symbolic Execution.
Inspired by the theory of chopped symbolic execution by David
et.al [48], which mainly targeted the exploration to paths of impor-
tance, we decide to separate the process of symbolic execution and
set each OO Block as an object to be analyzed. For each basic block
that needs to be analyzed, if it is previously determined to have two
successors, symbolic execution will be performed twice to find out
each of its successors separately. Otherwise the execution will be
performed only once. We use Angr [46] as our symbolic execution
engine to perform symbolic execution on each OO Block in turn.
6.3.2 Execution Process.
DiANa first pushes Relevant blocks into a block sequence. Initially,
these blocks are out of order. The Prologue block is the first one to
be analyzed. Note that in DiANa , we always assume that Prologue
has two succeeding branches. As a result, DiANa performs symbolic
execution twice on Prologue to explore both branches. We use the
break point function in Angr to interrupt the execution before
conditional move instructions. By changing the execution state, it
will let control flow enter both True and False branches.
When the execution stops before the break point, our system
will set the conditional flag in Angr’s Intermediate Representation
to symbol 0 and 1, respectively, for the purpose of exploring its
both following branches. For blocks with a single branch, DiANa
does not modify the state and analyzes them directly. The symbolic
execution will keep stepping on until reaching an element in the
block sequence or Return.
6.3.3 Cross-Function Protection.
During symbolic execution, it is possible to enter another func-
tion’s space through the function call. In ARM instructions, calling
functions are done via ‘BL’ or ‘BLX’. DiANa hooks these two
call instructions. When symbolic execution encounters hooked ad-
dresses, it will automatically skip the call instruction and continue
the analysis in the space of the current function.
6.3.4 Flow-Sensitive Execution.
Since there are dependencies between basic blocks in a function, the
deobfuscation process is flow-sensitive. If the symbolic execution
starting from each basic block uses a blank symbol state, it must
cause basic block mismatching due to the loss of necessary context.
As a result, while performing symbolic execution on basic blocks,
Algorithm 1: Dynamic Queue Scheduling Algorithm.
Input: Prologue P, Relevants R, Return Q
Output: Recovered control flow F
1 BlocksQueue[0] = P ;
2 BlocksQueue[1: ] = R + Q;
3 Swap_Pointer⇐ BlocksQueue[1];
4 for i in range(0: len(BlocksQueue)) do
5 BB = BlocksQueue[i];
6 if BB has saved_state then
7 RecoverState(SavedState);
8 else
9 RecoverState(BlankState);
10 end
11 successor_num = find_branch(BB);
12 if successor_num == 1 then
13 successor, CurrentState = SymbExec (BB, flag=None);
14 SavedState[successor] = save (CurrentState);
15 F[BB].successor += successor;
16 if successor.address > Swap_Pointer then
17 swap(successor, Swap_Pointer);
18 Swap_Pointer++;
19 end
20 else
21 successor1, CurrentState1 = SymbExec (BB, flag=true);
22 SavedState[successor1] = save (CurrentState1);
23 F[BB].successor += successor1;
24 if successor1.address > Swap_Pointer then
25 swap(successor1, Swap_Pointer);
26 Swap_Pointer++;
27 end
28 successor2, CurrentState2 = SymbExec (BB, flag=false);
29 SavedState[successor2] = save (CurrentState2);
30 F[BB].successor += successor2;
31 if successor2.address > Swap_Pointer then
32 swap(successor2, Swap_Pointer);
33 Swap_Pointer++;
34 end
35 end
36 end
37 return F
the deobfuscation system will dynamically save current execution
state and adjust the position of the elements in block sequence to
ensure the state inheritance.
Two pointers are used in the process of symbolic execution:
the Execution Pointer pointing to the current analyzing block, and
the Swap Pointer pointing to the front position that never being
swapped. Initially, the Execution Pointer points to the Prologue
and the Swap Pointer points to the first block in the block sequence.
The returned successor block will be swapped to the position that
the Swap Pointer points to. At the same time, the current symbolic
state will be saved. When the analysis proceeds to this successor,
the saved state will be restored. If the returned successor block is
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Figure 6: An example of dynamic queue scheduling.
before the Swap Pointer, there will be no exchange between basic
blocks. But the symbolic state of this successor will be updated.
After getting all successor block(s) of the current analyzing block,
the Execution Pointer will move to the next block. In special cases
when the two pointers coincide, DiANa will move the Swap Pointer
forward one space.
The purpose of dynamically exchanging basic blocks in the se-
quence is to ensure that most of the basic blocks inherit the state
from the previous analysis before execution, while not starting the
analysis of a basic block from a blank state.
Algorithm 1 presents the top-level algorithm of our dynamic
basic blocks scheduling approach. We also use Fig. 6 as an example
to show how this algorithm work. 1○ After analyzing the True
branch, the state before executing Block 5 is saved. 2○ Then Block
5 is exchanged to the first place of sequence and 3○ the Swap
Pointer is moved to the next. 4○ Following the analysis of the False
branch, 5○ the successor Block 3 is swapped with the second block
in sequence and 6○ the Swap Pointer is moved to the third position.
At the same time the state reaching Block 3 will be saved. After that,
7○ the Execution Pointer points to the first block (Block 5) in the
sequence and the previously saved state of Block 5 will be restored.
The analysis of other blocks will continue like this successively.
Performing symbolic execution in this way not only guarantees
the maximum state inheritance of each basic block, but also avoids
path explosion and ensures the order of the entire analysis process.
6.4 Control Flow Reconstruction
When using CFF to obfuscate the native code, there is a certain
degree of basic block splitting and merging due to ARM optimiza-
tions, no matter the basic block splitting pass is activated or not.
As a result, it is necessary to optimize the recovered control flow.
We apply two optimization here.
RULE i. As shown in Fig. 7 (1), for two nodes connected by a
direct jump, if the in-degree of the parent node is not greater than
one, DiANa merges these two nodes.
RULE ii. As shown in Fig. 7 (2), for multiple connected nodes, if
their out-degree are all equal to two and the other branch of them
points to a same node, once the contents of each node are alike
(e.g. comparing operation with consecutive integers), DiANa will
optimize this structure as a loop.
Note that when BCF and CFF are used together (with or without
InsSub), the introduction of opaque predicates does not affect the
recovery of original control flow. Because these blocks (previous
mentioned blocks in dead branch) are always unreachable, they
will be removed in the final output.
Figure 7: Control flow merging rules.
7 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
Our experiment is based on O-LLVM 4.0, while our approach can
be easily extened to code obfuscated by any OLLVM versions. We
use Android NDK V16.1 to build shared libraries. The symbolic
engine of DiANa is implemented based on Angr 7.8.2. The function
addresses are exported by IDA Pro 7.0.
7.1 Dataset
To evaluate the effectiveness of DiAna, we first need to build a
reliable open source dataset with high coverage. We have applied
our system to the following three different datasets, respectively.
C/C++ Obfuscation Benchmark.We first evaluate our system
on a widely used C/C++ obfuscation benchmark [5]. This dataset
was created by a previous work [25] to evaluate different obfusca-
tion algorithms. It includes common basic algorithms, hash func-
tions, and small programs (mainly containing combinations of IF,
WHILE, and FOR structures). We eliminated the benchmark programs
that contain only one basic block, because it is hard to apply ob-
fuscation techniques on these tiny programs. At last, we obtain
94 benchmark programs in total to evaluate the effectiveness of
DiANa.
Open-Source Android Native Code. To evaluate our system
on real-world Android apps, we have crawled 100 open source
Android projects from F-Droid [16]. Among them, 24 projects use
native code. Note that Android apps could use native code in two
ways: reusing the existing native libraries by embedding the ∗.so
in the project or implementing their own C/C++ code and then
compiling it within the project. Finally, we have identified 5 real-
world Android projects that contain open source C/C++ code, which
can be used to evaluate our approach.
Real-world Andrioid Root Exploit.We further apply DiANa
to Android Root Exploits (aka REs), a binary tool used to obtain
the root privilege by exploiting privilege escalation vulnerabili-
ties. In this case, we could evaluate the effectiveness of DiANa on
deobfuscating real threats in the wild.
7.2 Evaluation Metrics
We hereby define our evaluation metrics. We deployed Euclidean
Distance (ED), Similarity of Control Flow Graph (Sim),
and Input/Output equivalence (I/O) to evaluate the effective-
ness and correctness of DiANa . Because InsSub works at the as-
sembly instruction level and does not alter the control flow, we use
ED to measure the deobfuscation effectiveness and I/O to ensure
the correctness. For the BCF and CFF approaches, we deployed Sim
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to quantify the deobfuscation results, similar to previous work [57].
Most importantly, we also use I/O to ensure the deobfuscated func-
tion is semantically equivalent to the original one.
7.2.1 Euclidean Distance.
We use Euclidean Distance as a quantitative indicator of our work
on Instruction Substitution. To evaluate InsSub deobfuscation, we
first generate a feature vector for each function. Each dimension in
the vector represents the frequency of certain opcode. We calculate
the Euclidean distance [52] as in Formula 2.
d(x ,y) := sqrt(
n∑
i=1
(xi − yi )2) (2)
Here, x and y are the feature vectors of the obfuscated/deobfus-
cated function and the original one respectively, while n is the total
number of types of opcode used in functions x and y.
7.2.2 CFG Similarity Comparison.
From the perspective of reverse engineering, control flow analysis is
an important procedure. Due to the difficulty of patching (rewriting)
the CFF obfuscated native code at the assembly level, CFG analysis
is a key technique in static analysis for Android apps. We adopted
the algorithm of Hu [37] for computing the edit distance between
two CFGs, which was suggested as one of the best CFG comparison
algorithms in previous empirical study [30]. It has also been widely
used in previous work [57][43][34].
The basic idea of this algorithm is to build a cost matrix that
represents the costs of mapping different nodes in two graphs
G1 and G2. Then the Hungarian algorithm [40] is used to find an
optimal solution to the assignment problem in O(n3) time. Note
that when calculating the similarity, we perform content matching
(e.g. key API-call operation, instruction operands, etc) for each
node. Although it does not perfectly prove that the deobfuscated
semantics and the original semantics are completely equivalent,
we believe that matching node content can further enhance the
original similarity comparison algorithm, thus ensuring that the
similarity value can reflect the accuracy of deobfuscation results to
a certain extent.
We use the formula below to calculate the CFG similarity:
Sim(G1,G2) = 1 − σ (G1,G2)|N1 | + |N2 | + |E1 | + |E2 | (3)
Here, σ (G1,G2) represents the edit distance between G1 and G2,
|Ni | is the number of nodes in Gi , and |Ei | is the number of edges
inGi . The score given by Pearson correlation [44] is in the range of
[-1,1]. The closer the score is to 1, the more similar are the structures
of these two graphs. A similarity score less than 0 means that two
graphs are completely dissimilar [30].
7.2.3 Semantic Equivalence.
Though we adopt strict block matching in the calculation of CFG
similarity, it is not convincing enough to prove that the deobfus-
cated function is semantically equivalent to the original one. Due to
the change of the offset and function size, binary rewriting needs to
be performed on each subsequent instruction and function from the
∗.so file, which may bring disturbances to the deobfuscation result.
Also, to the best of our knowledge, there is no effective and accurate
way to solve the problem of binary rewriting yet, even from the
intermediate representation level. To minimize the introduction of
bias caused by other tools, we choose to show our deobfuscation re-
sult of the CFF method on the disassembly instruction level, which
is useful for reverse analysts to analyze malicious apps.
Regarding correctness, after applying deobfuscation, we use
Angr’s bit vector to generate 1,500 concrete value inputs (the 500
smallest integers, the 500 largest ones, 500 random others) and
test whether the two corresponding outputs (origin and deobfus-
cated) are identical. If yes, we consider the deobfuscated code as
semantically equivalent to the original one. We use Input/Output
equivalence (I/O) to represent this evaluation process, which
has also been widely used in previous work[45]. In order to visual-
ize the experimental results, we use the percentage of the identical
I/O in 1500 times of experiments as a quantitative indicator.
7.3 Evaluation on C/C++ Obfuscation
Benchmarks
Because InsSub only works on computation-intensive programs,
we select 5 programs with many computation-related instructions
from the benchmark to evaluate the result of InsSub deobfuscation.
For BCF and CFF, we apply them to all the 94 programs in
the benchmark and use DiANa to deobfuscate them. We classi-
fied the benchmark programs into 5 categories based on their
main functionalities: (1) sorting algorithm (Sort), (2) searching al-
gorithm (Search),(3) mathematical calculation (Math), (4) string
manipulation (String) and (5) conversion between number and
string (Num2String). Furthermore, we also evaluated DiANa on
cases when all three obfuscation techniques are applied.
7.3.1 Instruction Substitution.
The five programs used in the evaluation include: (1) Binary search,
(2) Merge sort, (3) String splicing operation, (4) Quicksort and (5) a
program with five arithmetical operations. For these programs, we
first apply InsSub to obfuscate the samples and then use DiANa to
deobfuscate them. Note that for the pass of instruction substitution,
we could deobfuscate the results to the binary level.
Euclidean Distance. Column 2 and 3 in Table 2 list the Eu-
clidean distance between the obfuscated function and the unob-
fuscated one (Dob ), and between the deobfuscated one and the
unobfuscated one (Dde ), respectively. As we can see, distances be-
tween obfuscated functions and unobfuscated ones are in the range
of 14 to 44. After deobfuscation, the distances of the recovered
functions are all below 10. Note that the gap between deobfuscated
and unobfuscated binary (Dde ) is mainly caused by the assignment
of registers and memory addresses, e.g., move, load and store
operations.
The number of obfuscated operations. We also manually
checked the obfuscated and deobfuscated programs to measure
the number of obfuscated operations (Nob ) introduced and the
number of operations (Nde ) successfully recovered, as listed in
Column 4 and Column 5 in Table 2. All the obfuscated operations
are successfully recovered to binary files in our experiment.
Semantic Equivalence.We then applied the aforementioned
approach (Section 7.2.3) to evaluate the semantic equivalence of
deobfuscated binaries and the original ones. As shown in the “SE”
column of Table 2, for each program, we get identical outputs for
8
Table 2: InsSub deobfuscation result.
Name Dob Dde Nob Nde SE
binarysearch 17 9 5 5 100%
mergesort 16 8 2 2 100%
concatstrings 22 0 3 3 100%
quicksort 14 3 2 2 100%
basic_arithmetic_operators 44 10 8 8 100%
all the 1500 generated inputs, suggesting that the deobfuscated
binaries are semantically equivalent to the original ones.
7.3.2 Bogus Control Flow.
BCF offers two additional obfuscation options bcf_loop and bcf
_prob, which controls the obfuscation times (default 1) and ob-
fuscation intense (default 30%). To evaluate the effectiveness of
DiANa on BCF deobfuscation, we applied two different levels of
obfuscation intense: the default obfuscation (bcf_prob=30%), and
enhanced obfuscation (bcf_prob=50%). We are also able to recover
the deobfuscated code to the binary level.
Result. Table 3 shows the overall result. Column “BCF” and Col-
umn “BCF_re” shows the result at the default obfuscation level, and
Column “BCF_50%” and Column “BCF_50%_re” shows the result
of the enhanced one. At the default level, the CFG similarity be-
tween the original program and the obfuscated program is 0.453 on
average, while the CFG similarity could reach up to an average of
0.870 after the deobfuscation process. For the enhanced obfuscation,
CFG similarity score of most obfuscated functions has a significant
decrease, with an average score of 0.296. Nevertheless, our system
could achieve similar good results at different obfuscation level,
with an average CFG similarity score of 0.855.
Semantic Equivalence. As shown in Table 3 (cf. Column “SE”),
all deobfuscation results are equivalent to the original ones, for
the two levels of BCF obfuscation. We further manually checked
the deobfuscation results of the 16 functions shown in Table 3 by
analyzing the instructions in each block of the CFGs, and found
that their semantics are indeed equivalent to the original ones.
7.3.3 Control Flow Flattening.
CFF offers an additional obfuscating option split_num, which
means to split the original basic block a specified number of times,
to increase the complexity of obfuscated control flow. In the evalu-
ation, we have applied two different obfuscation levels: the default
CFF obfuscation1, and an enhanced obfuscation level with the basic
block splitting option on split_num=3.
Result. Table 3 shows the results. Column “CFF” and Column
“CFF_re” shows the results on default obfuscation of CFF, and Col-
umn “CFF-3” and Column “CFF-3_re” shows the results of enhanced
obfuscation, respectively. Obviously, with CFF obfuscation, the ob-
fuscated code achieved significant differences compared to original
ones considering the CFG similarity. At the default obfuscation
level, the average CFG similarity score is only 0.206 after obfus-
cation, while our deobfuscation results could achieve a similarity
score of 0.807 on average. After activating basic block splitting,
similarity scores between the obfuscated and original function are
almost all negative correlation (-0.185 on average), which indicates
1O-LLVM itself does not split the basic block. However, due to optimizations during
ARM compilation, basic block splitting still exists to some extent.
(1) Unobfuscated Function (2) CFF-3 Obfuscated Function (3) Deobfuscated Function
Figure 8: A Deobfuscation Example of CFF.
that the obfuscated CFG is completely different from the original
one. The listed deobfuscation result of the enhanced CFF ranges
from 0.72 to 1. The average value on all 90 functions(4 failures with
O-LLVM compiling) is 0.722.
Case Study. Experimental results suggest that our approach
could achieve promising results on most cases. However, for sev-
eral cases, the CFG similarity of deobfuscated code with the original
binary is roughly 0.7. By further analyzing these cases, we found
that the main reason is the redistribution of semantics in the orig-
inal basic blocks. We use the program 16b-1-1-0-0-dc-2-2-0 as an
example to illustrate this situation. As shown in Fig. 8. This is a
function that calculates twice the sum of the ASCII codes of the in-
put string. The program got a recover result of 0.722 in both default
and enhanced obfuscation. Block A in the original CFG (Fig. 8 (a))
is a transition block, and we assume that its parent and child node
are directly connected. Also, the two self-loop basic blocks in the
original CFG become the loop between two blocks in the recovered
result. The key operation ‘ADD’ of the two self-loop structures in
the original function are now implemented in the split-out blocks
B and C, as shown in Fig. 8 (c). Thus operations on edges D and E
can be merged to another branch of its starting node. This example
suggests that CFF may separate constraints and operations during
obfuscation, which will lead to re-matching of nodes and edges
in the recovered result. However, this scenario will not affect the
analyzing results, but instead simplifying the analysis process.
Semantic Equivalence. Here we also use the I/O approach to
check whether our deobfuscation results are semantic equivalent
to the original ones. As shown in Table 3 (cf. Column “SE” ), for
the default CFF obfuscation, our deobfuscation results are totally
identical with the original semantics. However, for the enhanced
CFF obfuscation, we found some cases shared different outputs with
original ones, thus the overall semantic equivalent evaluation result
is 90%. By analyzing these exceptional cases, we found that the
main reason is introduced by function splitting (cf. Figure 9), as we
skipped the BL and BLX instructionswhenwe perform the semantic
equivalence evaluation. For such exceptional cases, we manually
compared the deobfuscated programs and the original ones, and
found that their semantics should be identical if we consider the
BL and BLX instructions (superimposing the recovered functions),
which we will elaborate in both following subsection and Section 8
7.3.4 Full Obfuscation (All 3 Techniques).
The aforementioned results suggest that DiANa can recover the
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Table 3: Deobfuscation results on the C/C++ Benchmark.
Name BCF BCF_re SE BCF_50% BCF_50%_re SE CFF CFF_re SE CFF-3 CFF-3_re SE ALL ALL_re SE
selectionsort 0.904 0.938 100% 0.398 0.938 100% 0.151 0.910 100% -0.160 0.875 100% -0.128 0.747 100%
bubblesort 0.709 0.852 100% 0.469 0.970 100% 0.200 0.818 100% -0.160 0.726 100% -0.230 0.821 100%
binarysearch 0.759 0.897 100% 0.372 0.923 100% 0.137 0.868 100% -0.192 0.868 100% 0.023 0.816 100%
binarysearchrec 0.597 0.750 100% 0.326 0.750 100% 0.318 0.843 100% -0.130 0.816 100% 0.023 0.816 100%
gcd 0.660 0.872 100% 0.388 0.872 100% 0.075 0.776 100% -0.211 0.776 100% -0.294 0.776 100%
lcm 0.152 0.912 100% 0.365 1.000 100% 0.172 0.857 100% -0.218 0.912 100% -0.218 0.912 100%
concatstrings 0.213 0.769 100% 0.133 0.795 100% 0.213 0.778 100% -0.261 0.872 100% -0.124 0.872 100%
reverse 0.280 1.000 100% 0.370 0.900 100% 0.292 0.926 100% -0.252 0.828 100% -0.114 0.828 100%
romannumerals 0.234 0.797 100% 0.321 0.816 100% 0.164 0.797 100% -0.250 0.869 100% -0.340 0.807 81%
decimaltobinary 0.184 0.906 100% 0.253 0.783 100% 0.310 0.854 100% -0.174 0.854 100% 0.016 0.854 100%
bkdrhash 0.175 0.828 100% 0.155 0.822 100% 0.294 0.926 100% -0.165 0.828 100% -0.070 0.926 67%
djbhash 0.378 0.828 100% 0.409 0.813 100% 0.264 0.926 100% -0.173 0.926 100% -0.198 0.742 100%
1b-1-2-2-1-
gt127-0-0-0 0.618 1.000 100% -0.029 1.000 100% 0.304 1.000 100% -0.135 1.000 100% -0.126 1.000 100%
1b-1-2-1-1-gtsum
127_dep-1-0-1 0.618 0.893 100% 0.083 0.737 100% 0.143 0.821 100% -0.224 0.750 100% -0.223 0.821 100%
16b-1-1-0-0
-dc-2-2-0 0.382 0.900 100% 0.534 0.821 100% 0.475 0.722 100% -0.161 0.722 100% -0.052 0.788 100%
1b-4-2-0-0
-dc-2-2-0 0.618 1.000 100% 0.196 0.742 100% 0.216 0.821 100% -0.149 0.821 100% -0.242 0.821 100%
Overall similarity
of Approach △ - - - - - - 0.206 0.674 - -0.185 0.393 - -0.132 0.450 -
Overall similarity
of DiANa 0.453 0.870 100% 0.296 0.855 100% 0.206 0.807 100% -0.185 0.722 90% -0.132 0.734 94%
obfuscated samples accurately for each pass of O-LLVM.We further
evaluate it if three obfuscation techniques are used at the same time.
Result. The result is shown in the last three Columns in Table 3.
Obviously, the combined techniques introduce strong obfuscation
impacts, with negative CFG similarity scores for most cases. The
average CFG similarity score after obfuscation is -0.132 on average.
However, DiANa could achieve good results compared with single
pass evaluation, with an average CFG similarity score of 0.734
after deobfuscation. For example, the romannumberals function,
which converts decimal numbers to Roman characters, has more
than 500 basic blocks after hybrid obfuscation of O-LLVM. The
CFG similarity score of the obfuscated function is -0.340, which is
the lowest. The deobfuscating result on romannumberals is 0.807,
showing that DiANa is resilient to complicated code obfuscation.
Semantic Equivalence.We further perform semantic equiva-
lence evaluation. As shown in the last column of Table 3, besides
several exceptional cases (e.g., bkdrhash), we could get identical
outputs for most cases, and thus the final average result is 94%.
Note that we further manually analyzed the extreme cases, and
found the leading reason is the same with the cases we identified
in CFF deobfuscation, i.e., function splitting (cf. Section 8).
7.3.5 Comparing with Existing Studies.
In previous studies, Francis Gabriel [35] attempted to recover O-
LLVMobfuscated code on the X86 platform based on theMiasm [17]
framework. Specifically, his work only aimed to recover correspond-
ing CFGs of functions protected by one of the three obfuscating
techniques in O-LLVM. However, as we illustrated in Section 2, it
did not tackle multiple challenges introduced by ARM and Android.
In this subsection, we would like to compare his work (we use the
symbol △ to represent it) with ours. Because the Approach △ could
not be used to deobfuscate Android native functions directly, we
make the compromise to remove the context inheritance algorithm
and control flow reconstructing rules in DiANa and assume that
Approach △ could achieve the alike deobfuscation result with the
degraded DiANa . Obviously it is unfair to our approach considering
the adoption of numerous improvements and innovations beside
these two dominating ideas. However, if DiANa could produce
better results than Approach △ in this scenario, the deobfuscating
ability of DiANa will be convincing.
As shown in Table 3, not surprisingly, the average similarities
of the obfuscated functions in these three cases (CFF, CFF-3 and
ALL) are exactly the same. However, the average deobfuscated
CFG similarity of Approach △ in the CFF situation is 0.674. Even
worse, the similarity values decline dramatically to 0.393 and 0.450,
CFF-3 and ALL respectively. With regard to those relatively large
or basic-block-split functions, our further manual investigation
demonstrates that the recovered result of Approach △ is fragmented,
and the corresponding caller-callee relationships between many
basic blocks are lost, i.e., there does not exist any recovered path to
reach the Return block. Due to its essence of unreliable results, we
do not use the I/O approach to prove the correctness of Approach
△. As such, we have demonstrated that DiANa could achieve more
accurate and convincing deobfuscation results.
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Table 4: Deobfuscation result on open-source Android apps.
APK Name Function Name CFF CFF_re SE BCF BCF_re SE
rdft 0.199 0.919 100% 0.166 0.702 100%
newFFT 0.174 0.792 100% 0.704 0.792 100%
makect 0.325 0.913 100% 0.244 0.786 100%Practice Hub
Total 10 0.365 0.843 100% 0.446 0.795 100%
free 0.228 0.889 100% 0.338 0.752 100%
seekToFrame 0.017 0.725 100% 0.537 0.795 100%
seekToTime -0.004 0.698 100% 0.607 0.871 100%Overchan
Total 17 0.138 0.745 94% 0.339 0.761 100%
InRowNative 0.389 0.717 100% 0.457 0.654 100%
BWNative 0.417 0.714 100% 0.683 0.892 100%
ColorNative 0.009 0.712 100% 0.486 0.712 100%AsciiCam
Total 3 0.266 0.714 100% 0.542 0.753 100%
anagrams_init 0.133 0.802 100% 0.143 0.911 100%
Anagrams_uninit 0.791 (0.077) 0.333 (0.875) 27(100)% 0.800 (0.122) 0.160 (0.810) 21(100)%
anagram 0.174 0.830 100% 0.058 0.784 100%Agram
Total 24 0.198 0.761 100% 0.511 0.777 100%
createWnnWork 0.067 0.747 100% 0.306 0.848 100%
freeWnnWork 0.149 0.875 100% 0.316 0.737 100%NicoWnnG
Total 2 0.108 0.811 100% 0.311 0.792 100%
7.4 Evaluation on Open-Source Android Apps
The five open source Android apps used in our evaluation are:
(1) Practice Hub (com.proch.practicehub.src), a tool for musicians;
(2) Overchan (bus.chio.wishmaster), an app for browsing different
kinds of imageboards; (3) AsciiCam (com.dozing catsoftware.asciicam),
a photography app generates ASCII images in real time, with more
than 100K downloads in Google Play; (4) Agram (us.achromatic
metaphor.agram), a tool to list single-word and multi-word ana-
grams in English; (5) NicoWnnG (net.gorry.android.input.nicownng),
a keyboard IME with more than 50K downloads in Google Play.
Result. For each open-source app, we first extract its native
source code. Then we use O-LLVM to perform obfuscation when
building ∗.so according to Application.mk and Android.mk in the
original Android projects. In the deofuscation process, we filtered
the functions that contain only one basic block. At last, we analyzed
56 functions in total.
Table 4 shows the overall deobfuscation results. For binaries ob-
fuscated with BCF (with average CFG similarity score ranging from
0.311 to 0.542), our approach could achieve a CFG similarity score
in the range from 0.753 to 0.795 on average after deobfuscation. For
binaries obfuscated with CFF (with average CFG similarity score
ranging from 0.108 to 0.365), our approach could achieve a CFG sim-
ilarity score around 0.75 on average after deobfuscation. Although
the overall result is acceptable, for a few cases, our approach did not
achieve good results as other cases. We further manually analyzed
these cases.
We found that the main reason leading to the CFG inconsistency
is function splitting. We use function “Anagrams_uninit” in “Agram”
to illustrate it. Sometimes an operation in the original ∗.so can
be implemented by one function, while in the obfuscated binary,
part of this operation may be split out and used as a sub-function
due to optimizations. As shown in Fig. 9 (2), the CFG of deobfus-
cated function only contains 4 basic blocks. In the first block, this
recovered function calls “sub_5F24”, which is also obfuscated by
O-LLVM. The deobfuscation of “sub_5F24” is shown in Fig. 9 (3).
After superimposing these two recovered functions’ CFG, it can
be seen that the similarity between original and recovered CFG is
very high. The deobfuscation results are 0.875 for CFF and 0.810 for
BCF, compare to 0.333 and 0.16 respectively. This result suggests
that function splitting could greatly affect the result. Thus, in our
0x5DFC                                            
...
ADD             R7, PC, R0 ; 'handle'
MOV             R0, R6
BL        sub_5F24
MOV             R8, R0
LDR             R0, [R6]
MOV             R1, R5
LDR             R2, [R0,#0x7C]
LDR             R4, [R0,#0x178]
...
0x5EB0                                            
...
CMP             R1, #0
MOVEQ           R0, R7
...
0x5F04                                            
% End of function
0x5E78                                            
...
MOV             R3, #0
LDR             R4, [R0,#0x1A0]
LDR             R2, [SP,#0x20+var_20]
MOV             R0, R6
BLX             R4
...
0x5F24                                            ...
BLX             R2
MOV             R1, R0
LDR             R0, =(aB - 0x5F74)
MOV             R2, R6
ADD             R3, PC, R0 ; ‘[B’
MOV             R0, R5
...
0x6034                                            
...
LDR             R3, [R0,#0x17C]
LDR             R2, [SP,#0x30+var_2C]
MOV             R0, R5
BLX             R3
...
0x5FF8                                            
...
LDR             R0, [SP,#0x30+var_28]
CMP             R0, #0
MOVEQ           R1, R9
...
0x5F88                                            
...
CMP             R1, R0
...
0x5FC0                                            
...
LDR             R2, [R0,#0x2AC]
LDR             R1, [SP,#0x30+var_28]
MOV             R0, R5
BLX             R2
...
0x60AC                                            
% End of function
0x6078                                            
...
LDR             R4, [R0,#0x320]
LDR             R1, [SP,#0x30+var_28]
ADD             R0, SP, #0x30+var_24
...
0x5F9C                                            
...
MOV             R7, #0
CMP             R0, #0
MOVEQ           R1, R4
...
(1) Unobfuscated Function (2) Deobfuscated Function (3) Deobfuscated Sub-Function
0x3DCC                                            
...
LDR             R2, [R0,#0x7C]
LDR             R7, [R0,#0x178]
MOV             R0, R5
BLX             R2
...
CMP             R2, #0
...
0x3E24
% End of function
0x3E0C                                            
...
MOV             R3, #0
LDR             R7, [R0,#0x1A0]
MOV             R0, R5
...
0x3CFC                                            
...
ADD             R3, PC, R0 ; '[B'
MOV             R0, R5
BLX             R6
CMP             R2, #0
...
0x3D5C                                            
...
LDR             R3, [R0,#0x17C]
MOV             R0, R5
BLX             R3
...
0x3DC8                                            
...
MOV             R6, #0
...
0x3D7C                                            
...
LDR             R2, [R0,#0x2AC]
MOV             R0, R5
BLX             R2
MOV             R6, #0
CMP             R0, #4
...
0x3D9C                                            
...
MOV             R2, #0
MOV             R3, #4
LDR             R6, [R0,#0x320]
...
Figure 9: Another deobfuscation case (Anagrams_uninit).
Table 5: The deobfuscation result on the PoC imple-
mentation of towelroot.
function name CFF CFF_re SE ALL ALL_re SE
accept_socket 0.302 0.797 100% -0.270 0.913 100%
make_socket 0.346 0.667 100% -0.267 0.935 100%
init_exploit 0.203 0.903 100% -0.044 1.000 100%
send_magicmsg 0.149 0.963 100% 0.149 0.962 100%
read_pipe 0.111 1.000 100% -0.265 1.000 100%
search_goodnum 0.193 0.939 100% -0.245 0.900 100%
make_action 0.367 1.000 100% -0.157 0.850 100%
write_kernel 0.211 0.966 100% -0.210 0.703 100%
wake_actionthread 0.216 0.927 100% -0.220 0.912 100%
main 0.194 1.000 100% -0.253 0.652 100%
write_pipe 0.111 1.000 100% -0.161 1.000 100%
implementation, we take the function splitting into consideration,
which is not carefully considered in previous studies [15, 35, 57].
Semantic Equivalence. As shown in the Column “SE” of Ta-
ble 4, except for app “Overchan", all the recovered functions of the
rest apps get 100% identical outputs in our I/O approach.We further
manually analyzed such cases, and found that their semantics are
completely equivalent to the original semantics, while this result is
introduce by the limitation of our I/O approach (cf. Section 8).
7.5 Evaluation on Real-world Exploits
CVE-2014-3153 [1] is a well-known generic vulnerabilities in the
Linux kernel, i.e., the Fast User space muTEX (futex) subsystem,
which is the basis of several mutual exclusion mechanisms. Its
exploitation (e.g., towelroot [3] and different variants) had been
widely spread around world. The original towelroot was protected
by O-LLVM, which took researchers a long time to understand the
technical details by performing laborious reverse engineering. As
shown in the motivating example (Fig. 1), it is quite difficult, if not
impossible, for researchers (even experienced experts) to figure out
the details from the obfuscated CFG directly.
Result. As of this writing, the source code of the original tow-
elroot is still unavailable. Fortunately, some researchers have pub-
lished their results, which can be regarded as the identical PoCs
of the original one. We will then demonstrate the capability of
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⑴⑵
Figure 10: CFG comparison of search_goodnum: ((1) Deobfuscated Graph; (2) Unobfuscated Graph.Obfuscated Graph in Fig. 1.)
our system based on one of them [2], and the results are summa-
rized in Table 5. For simplicity, we focus on two key functions, i.e.,
“search_goodnum” and “send_magicmsg”, to illustrate our work.
The deobfuscation results of “send_magicmsg” and “search_good-
num” in “CFF” situation are 0.963 and 0.939 respectively, which
means that the deobfuscated CFGs are almost the same as the orig-
inal ones. In “ALL” obfuscation situation, these two value are 0.962
and 0.900 respectively. Fig. 10 shows the comparison between the
two CFGs of “search_goodnum”. Compared to the obfuscated CFG
shown in Fig. 1, it is obviously much easier to understand the logic
of the exploitation, especially the system call sequences and key
operands, from the deobfuscated CFG.
Semantic Equivalence.We also use the I/O approach to prove
the deobfuscation results are semantic equivalent to the original
function. As shown in Table 5, for all cases, all the outputs of deob-
fuscated functions are identical to the outputs of ones, considering
the same 1,500 inputs.
8 THREATS TO VALIDITY AND DISCUSSION
Although the experimental results suggest that DiANa achieves
good performance in recovering O-LLVM obfuscated functions, our
study, however, carries a few threats to validity.
Inherent Limitations of IDA Pro and Angr. Since parts of
our system build upon several state-of-the-art tools, which might
introduce inherent limitations. As we perform function-level deob-
fuscation in this work, it is important to recognize the initial address
and the basic blocks in each function. However, it is possible that
IDA Pro cannot identify the address of a function accurately, which
may lead to inaccuracy of our evaluation. In addition, we rely on
Angr to perform symbolic execution, while the instructions that
cannot be accurately recognized by Angr will likely cause inaccu-
racies. These are the limitations inherited from IDA Pro and Angr,
although they rarely occur during our experiments.
Semantic Equivalence. Our experiment suggested that, for a
small number of cases, there exist inconsistencies in evaluating
the semantic equivalence of deobfuscated binaries and the original
ones. We further manually explored these cases and pinpoint the
following two reasons.
First, as we use symbolic execution to run the function at the
IR level, the BL and BLX instructions sometimes may affect the
proper execution of the symbolic execution engine. As shown in
Fig. 9, the semantics of function sub_5F24 is split from the original
function. At the very beginning, we try to enter the callee but
unfortunately, the execution engine crashed there for quite a few
times. Thus, when evaluating semantic equivalence, instead of
entering the callee function, we skip them due to the uncertainty
of the callee’s space. Based on the manual analysis of such samples,
we observe that the semantics of them are completely recovered by
DiANa . It is worth mentioning that we also skip callee functions
in the deobfuscation process, but it will not affect the recovered
control flow, as the flow is routed by Vroutinд , which will not be
modified cross function or through a callee function.
Second, we saved the symbolic state after each time of symbolic
execution in Algorithm 1. Actually, the chopped process of symbolic
execution of a block may produce multiple different states before a
successor. In the evaluation, DiANa only saves one single state, and
the state will be updated in the following analysis if it is found to
be a non-blank state. It makes our evaluation to be quite effective.
However, in some exceptional cases, very few paths may not be
found due to the loss of necessary states. In our work, we make
the number of saved states of one single block configurable, i.e.,
users could increase the number of states to save. Increasing the
number of saved states will improve our analysis results, as the
saved variables are all inherited from the pre-executions.
Although our semantic evaluation approach does not report 100%
identical for several cases, our manually efforts confirmed that all
such cases were introduced by the aforementioned reasons, and
the recovered programs keep the same semantics actually.
9 CONCLUSION
We have presented a novel approach for deobfuscating Android
native code. It uses taint analysis to make semantic-level deobfusca-
tion, and leverages an enhanced flow-sensitive symbolic execution
to rebuild the seriously obfuscated control flow. We have imple-
mented our approach in a system called DiANa , and demonstrated
that DiANa could successfully reverse obfuscations performed by
O-LLVM with high accuracy. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first work that tackles the problem of Android native code deob-
fuscation. We believe that our system could become an useful tool
for security analysts and researchers to conduct studies including
malware detection and program analysis.
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